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Studies on teachable agents (TA) have repeatedly demon-
strated their benefits in primary school pupils’ learning, but
no study has yet been devised to investigate whether the same
effects can be observed in preschoolers. Preschool age is
an important time for development of executive functions
(EF) and theory of mind (ToM), and it can be argued that
preschoolers might not be able to pay enough attention to a
TA due to underdevelopment of these cognitive abilities. In
this study, visual distractions in the form of animated objects
were incorporated into a mathematics game for preschoolers
which utilises a TA. 65 preschoolers participated in the
study which investigated whether they were able to ignore
these distractions in favour of focusing on the TA’s actions.
The results showed a statistically significant difference in
preschoolers visual attention to the animations played during
the TA’s action to those played after the TA’s action. This
result is a crucial step forward in further development of
TA-based games for preschoolers.
Keywords: teachable agent, attention, executive functions,
theory of mind, preschooler, distractibility, eyetracking
1 Introduction
The Swedish National Agency for Education states in the
preschool curriculum that the preschool work team should
“challenge the curiosity of children and their growing under-
standing of . . . mathematics, as well as science and techno-
logy” (Skolverket, 2011, p. 11). The curriculum also states
that the “preschool should strive to ensure that [all children] . . .
develop their ability to identify technology in everyday life,
and explore how simple technology works, . . . develop their
ability to distinguish, express, examine and use mathematical
concepts and their interrelationships” (p. 10). Furthermore,
the preschool should offer “[p]edagogical activities . . . related
to the needs of all children in the preschool” (p. 5).
In order to relate to the pedagogical needs of pupils, indi-
vidualised tutoring is crucial which enables support for strug-
gling pupils. It is not uncommon for primary school pupils
to struggle with mathematics. This can be traced back to
not being trained enough in simple mathematical reasoning at
an early age for number sense to emerge (Gersten & Chard,
1999). Using educational software in preschool, customisable
for each individual, could be a way to more easily fulfil the
quite demanding goals of the preschool curriculum mentioned
above. It can also facilitate the use of a very successful teach-
ing paradigm called learning by teaching, which has shown
great success in low-achieving primary school pupils’ learn-
ing through the use of digital teachable agents (Chase, Chin,
Oppezzo & Schwartz, 2009). The question is whether the
same effects can be observed in preschoolers. Preschool age is
an important time for cognitive development and preschoolers
might not possess the cognitive prerequisites necessary to reap
the same learning benefits as primary school children.
The study presented in this thesis explores the possibilities
of using a teachable agent in a computer based game of math-
ematics for preschoolers. The main goal was to investigate
whether preschoolers are too easily distracted, due to under-
development of cognitive functions, to be able to pay attention
to the agent.
Teachable Agents and Learning by Teaching
A teachable agent (TA) can be described as an autonomous,
digital tutee incorporated in educational computer software.
Studies have shown that a TA is a fruitful tool for educating
primary school pupils (e.g. Gulz, Haake & Silvervarg, 2011;
D. Schwartz & Blair, 2007). The idea is that a pupil takes the
role as a teacher in order to tutor the TA. This role switching
encourages the pupil to take responsibility for someone else’s
learning (c.f., Protégé Effect; Chase et al., 2009) within the
learning-by-teaching framework (see e.g. Biswas, Leelawong,
Schwartz, Vye & The Teachable Agents Group at Vanderbilt,
2005; Brophy, Biswas, Katzlberger, Bransford & Schwartz,
1999).
It has been shown that teaching others is a very effective
way of learning for oneself (Bargh & Schul, 1980). One ex-
planation for this is that in order to teach someone else you
will need to be well-read and prepared. Some great advantages
of using a TA for this purpose are that all pupils can become
teachers, regardless of their abilities and beliefs in their own
ability, and that no actual pupil suffers from a poor teacher.
Also, the learning-by-teaching paradigm creates what is called
an ego-protective buffer. When, for example, tests are con-
ducted they can be taken by the TA. This enables the pupil
to attribute responsibility to the TA, which makes test failures
easier to handle because the pupil does not have to carry the
full burden of a poor result since the test result can be partly
attributed to the TA (Chase et al., 2009). This can lead to that
a pupil will not become as easily discouraged by a difficult
subject.
Another proposed major benefit of the learning-by-
teaching framework is that it stimulates reflective thinking
about problem-solving and learning, so called metacognition.
This is made possible through the tutor’s monitoring of the
tutee’s actions and problem-solving over time. A study by
Gelman and Meck (1983) showed that children were better at
monitoring and reflecting upon adults counting, near the limit
of the children’s abilities, than the children were when per-
forming the counting themselves. The children were thus able
to free cognitive load when observing the adults which allows
these freed resources to be utilised on metacognitive reason-
ing. It is of course vital that the child pays close attention to
the adult in order to be able to reflect on the adults progress
in counting. The same is true in the use of TAs. A study
by Lindström, Gulz, Haake and Sjödén (2011) showed that
primary school children were concentrating on, as well as at-
tending to, their TA regardless of whether they were in charge
of game play or just observed the TA playing. Just as with the
child observing the adult counting, this is important in order
for the pupil to be able to reflect on the agents learning which
facilitates the emergence of metacognition.
The largest gains in using a TA have been observed in low-
achieving pupils. They seem to have a higher learning rate
with a TA whilst their high-achieving peers do just as good
with as without a TA (Chase et al., 2009).
In sum, there is a body of research on the topic of TAs
that all provide evidence for the educational benefits (Chase
et al., 2009; Gulz et al., 2011; Pareto, Arvemo, Dahl, Haake
& Gulz, 2011; Pareto, Haake, Lindström, Sjödén & Gulz,
2012; D. Schwartz & Blair, 2007; D. L. Schwartz et al., 2009;
Sjödén, Tärning, Pareto & Gulz, 2011). However, all of these
focus on primary school pupils aged between 7 and 14. Thus,
there is hitherto no clear evidence that the benefits of a TA can
be generalised to preschoolers.
In a pilot study, Axelsson, Anderberg and Haake (2013)
tested a mathematical game on 10 preschoolers. The game,
— called Bird Hero — has a TA incorporated in the form of
a panda. The study showed that these preschoolers were able
to play the game with ease without the TA being obtrusive to
game interaction and it also showed that the children seemed
to pay attention to the TA and its actions.
With the knowledge that TAs serve as a very beneficial
tool for learning, the purpose of the present study was to build
on the work by Axelsson et al. (2013) by conducting a larger
and more systemised study on preschoolers ability to attend
to TAs. Previous mentioned studies on TAs have mostly used
games built around mathematics. This because mathematics
is easy to adapt into software games due to its strict formal
structure. Bird Hero will be used in the present study and its
preschool mathematical concept revolves around helping chil-
dren acquire number sense.
Number Sense
Number sense refers to an understanding of the meaning of
numbers and the ability to make comparisons, as well as show-
ing fluency with numbers (Gersten & Chard, 1999), and an un-
derstanding that they relate to quantities (Griffin, 2004). Basic
number sense usually emerges in a child through normal inter-
action with parents and siblings. If it does not emerge, or if the
child does not develop it sufficiently during preschool years, it
is not unusual for the child to have difficulties in understand-
ing more complex mathematics once in primary school (Berch,
2005; Gersten & Chard, 1999; Jordan, Kaplan, Nabors Oláh &
Locuniak, 2006). Number sense can be taught (Griffin, 2004),
and for children who have not been exposed to numerical reas-
oning at home, formal training of number sense is essential
(Bruer, 1997).
Bird Hero
The game Bird Hero — developed by Anderberg, Axels-
son, Bengtsson, Håkansson and Lindberg (2013) — revolves
around a flock of chicks that are blown out of their nests and
whom need help to get back up. The player helps the chicks
return home via a lift by pushing lift buttons. The chicks, one
at a time, presents a number of feathers representing the floor
they live on. The player’s task is to match this number with
one of eight lift buttons presented at the bottom of the com-
puter screen (see e.g. Figure 3a). After a while, the TA is
introduced and asks the player if he can watch the player in
order to learn how to operate the lift. Further on, the TA asks
whether he can take over and try to help the birds by suggest-
ing which lift button the player should press. The player is
then allowed to correct the TA when the player believes the
TA makes a mistake.
If the player or the TA chooses the correct lift button, the
bird will arrive at its nest and will give off a cheerful chirp. If
the player or the TA chooses an incorrect lift button, the bird
will end up on the wrong floor and explain to the player that
she lives either further up or lower down. The idea behind us-
ing a lift is that it represents a vertical number line. It gives a
good representation of parts of the whole — branches as floors
— and that higher numbers are placed higher up spatially. It
is important, in a child’s numerical development, to use famil-
iar concepts (Griffin, 2004; Hannula, Mattinen & Lehtinen,
2005), and a lift, which in itself contains mathematical proper-
ties — numbered buttons representing floors — is a common
feature in our society.
Educational mathematical software — such as Bird Hero
— should well fit the purpose for formal training of number
sense in preschool. The ability to customise educational soft-
ware is essential to meet the needs for individualised tutor-
ing. This in conjunction with the use of a TA could potentially
be an enhancement in a child’s acquisition of number sense,
partly due to potential benefits such as the ego-protective buf-
fer, but also because the TA and the game environment can
provide consequence feedback. An example of this from above
is when the bird arrives at the floor which the player has sent
her. Instead of just telling the player whether a choice is cor-
rect or incorrect, the feedback is incorporated into the game’s
narrative and gives more concrete feedback as to whether his
or her choice was correct, over-, or underestimated. This is
far more insightful than just being told whether an answer is
correct or incorrect (Zhao & Shen, 2012). Furthermore, a TA
can be developed as to also provide mathematical reasoning
geared towards the preschooler’s level of number sense.
Prerequisites
There are two possible caveats with regard to intentional focus
on TAs when it comes to the cognitive abilities of preschool
children. These are related to executive functions and theory
of mind.
To stay focused on what is essential, it is very important to
be able to perform top-down guidance of one’s own attention.
This is handled by our executive functions, such as inhibitory
skills (Sarter, Givens & Bruno, 2001). If an object appears to
be moving in you peripheral vision, it is very hard to resist the
temptation of looking at that object. The ability to do so is an
example of the executive function of inhibition.
TAs are meant to learn and they are programmed to act as
social characters. Thus, any teacher of such an agent must be
able to reflect upon the agent’s learning. This would suggest
that a developed theory of mind might be necessary in order
to make use of a TA’s full potentials. A developed theory of
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mind means that you understand that other people have a mind,
which can hold views, beliefs, and desires separate from your
own.
Executive functions and theory of mind share an important
development period during the ages between 3 and 5 (Garon,
Bryson & Smith, 2008; Perner & Lang, 1999). There is, how-
ever, no fixed moment in time at which these abilities come
into play, the development of them is instead gradual. As dis-
cussed above, primary school pupils pay a lot of attention to
their TA (Lindström et al., 2011) similarly to the children pay-
ing attention to adults counting in the study of Gelman and
Meck (1983). Because of the development period of execut-
ive functions and theory of mind during preschool age, it can
be argued that preschoolers are not developed enough in their
cognitive abilities to benefit from a TA the way primary school
pupils do. Developing a fully functioning TA-based game is
very costly and time consuming. Thus, it is vital to conduct a
study to investigate whether preschoolers have the basic cog-
nitive abilities necessary to even begin benefiting from a TA.
Executive Functions. Executive functions enable humans to
become conductors of their own lives. Among these, in-
hibitory skills are found which facilitates control of atten-
tion. Several cognitive scientists consider inhibition to be
a primary function in executive control (Burgess, Alderman,
Evans, Emslie & Wilson, 1998; Garavan, 2002; Norman &
Shallice, 2000). If an object appears to be moving in you peri-
pheral vision, it is very hard to resist the temptation of looking
at that object. The ability to do so is an example of the execut-
ive function of inhibition. Inhibition is thus the explicit control
of your mental and motor reflexes, and it is also deemed im-
portant to selective attention (Kok, 1999; Tipper & Cranston,
1985). Selective attention is your ability to stay so focused on
one aspect of your environment that you ignore other, a study
showed that focusing intently on a task can essentially render
you deaf (Dalton & Fraenkel, 2012). Sustained attention, on
the other hand, is your ability to remain alert and refrain from
letting your mind slip. This can be particularly hard when per-
forming a mundane, monotonous task. In such situations, your
mind can easily wander and it then becomes very easy not pay
attention to what you are doing.
Another important part of attention is the ability to shift fo-
cus, this is usually called set shifting and is viewed, alongside
inhibition, as one of the most important aspects of executive
functions (Monsell, 2003).
Theory of Mind and False Belief. If you have a developed
theory of mind, this means that you understand that other
people have a mind which can hold views, beliefs, and de-
sires separate from your own. The most standardised way of
measuring theory of mind is looking at a persons understand-
ing that others can possess a false belief, that is, that others can
hold beliefs which diverge from your own.
Clements and Perner (1994) showed that some children, al-
though they did not fully pass the false belief tasks, did seem
to have an implicit understanding of false belief. This finding
was later corroborated by Garnham and Perner (2001). This
means that there are different levels in the development of the-
ory of mind. Generally, at the age of six all children have a
fully developed theory of mind which they can explicitly verb-
alise and it has been suggested that a fully explicit theory of
mind is developed through language understanding. However,
false belief has been observed in children as young as seven-
teen months (Southgate, Chevallier & Csibra, 2010). There
are also indications of connections between executive func-
tions and theory of mind. For example, Moore, Jarrold, Rus-
sell, Lumb and Sapp (1995) found that some theory of mind
tasks are dependent on executive control.
Distractibility
From studies on attention deficit hyperactivity disorder it has
been demonstrated that people with attention problems have
trouble performing many executive function tasks (Barkley,
1998 and Pennington, 1997 in Garon et al., 2008). Due to the
ongoing development of executive functions in preschoolers, a
very convincing argument can thus be made against using TA-
based games in preschool education, namely that preschoolers
might be too easily distracted — especially in a lively envir-
onment such as a preschool — to be able to spend the time
and effort needed to engage with and attend to a TA. Atten-
tion, however, is an elusive concept and near impossible to
measure. Studies have found a close relation between atten-
tion and eye movements (see e.g. Deubel & Schneider, 1996).
However, looking does not imply attending. Anyone who has
spent time with a dull character at a social event can attest to
that just because you are looking at something does not mean
you are paying attention to it. One way around this problem is
instead to measure preschoolers’ distractibility in a short time
span where focus is needed elsewhere in a TA-based game.
Purpose
The aim of the present study was to shed light on the use of
TAs in a mathematical game for preschool children. The study
primarily focused on investigating preschoolers ability to in-
hibit distractions in a situation where they needed to attend to
the actions of a TA. Furthermore, the study was designed to
look at preschoolers inclination to inhibit distractions in re-
lation to their development of executive functions and theory
of mind. The long term goal is to aid further development of
games utilising TAs, such as Bird Hero, with its potential edu-
cational benefits in store for preschoolers.
Research Questions
(1) Can preschoolers be focused enough on a TA’s actions to
inhibit distractions?
(2) What differs between preschoolers who are able to in-
hibit distractions from those who are less able to do so, in
terms of executive control and theory of mind?
(3) With the results from research question 1 and 2, is it
possible to find a recommended age at which TA-based
games should be introduced in order to be beneficial for
preschoolers?
Expected Outcomes
The general hypothesis behind this study is that a preschooler
with more developed executive functions and theory of mind
should be less inclined to attend to a distraction during a TA
action than a peer with less development of such cognitive
abilities. The expectation is to find a gradient of development
of these abilities among the participants, and thus a correlative
gradient of attention to distractions. The expectation is also
to find a stronger relation between distractibility and devel-
opment of executive functions than with development of the-
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Figure 1: Regression lines of hypothesised data where executive
functions and theory of mind act as predictors of distractibility.
ory of mind (see hypothesised regression in Figure 1), simply
because executive functions are the driving forces of explicit,
top-down guided attention.
Thus, on a side note, because of the intertwined relation-
ship between executive functions and theory of mind, one po-
tentially interesting and more exploratory aspect of this study
could be to look at whether a well-developed theory of mind
could have a motivational effect strong enough to compensate
for less developed executive control with regard to distractib-
ility in relation to social characters (see hypothesised graph in
Figure 2).
2 Method
Participants
65 children (34 girls) aged between 3;1 and 6;3 years from a
preschool in Southern Sweden were given permission through
written consent forms by their guardians to participate in the
experiment. The particular preschool was selected because it
is situated in an area which is representative of Sweden with
regard to level of education and income among its population.
Ethics
This study was conducted as a part of the project “Play
for Knowledge: Can Preschoolers Learn Through Teaching,
and can Speech Production Enhance Their Understanding for
Other Peoples Perspective?”, and has been approved by the
Regional Ethical Review Board of Lund (ref. 2013/111).
Equipment
A remote eye tracker (SMI RED 500) was used along with
two desktop PCs, an external computer microphone, external
sound card (Edirol UA-25), and headphones (AKG K271).
All pre-test stimuli were developed in Python using the open
source PsychoPy2 application (v.1.76.00; Peirce, 2007).
Measurements and Procedures
All participants were subjected to pre-tests which measured
their current level of development in executive functions and
theory of mind. The results of these tests were used to build
a profile around each participant in order to facilitate extrac-
tion of vital components in voluntary focus of attention and
inhibition of distracting stimuli.
The executive functions measured were inhibition and sus-
tained attention. To test inhibition, Apple Defender was used,
which tests motor inhibition, and Shape School, which tests
task inhibition. To test sustained attention Colour-SART was
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Figure 2: Hypothesised relation between distractibility and high/low
development in executive functions and theory of mind.
used.
Correct attribution of false belief was tested in two tasks
as a measure of theory of mind through the Sally-Anne and
Droodle tasks.
General Procedure. All tasks were carried out over three
separate sessions for each participant in a secluded part of the
participant’s department of the preschool. The room utilised
was either a play or computer room to which the door could
be closed. In the first session the Apple Defender task, Sally-
Anne task, and Colour-SART task were performed. After
the pre-tests, the participants played Bird Hero without any
distracting visual stimuli in order to familiarise themselves
with the game. In the second session the Shape School and
Droodle tasks were performed together with a second exper-
iment leader who was collecting data from the same parti-
cipants for a separate study at the preschool. In the third and
final session, the participants played Bird Hero with the dis-
tracting visual stimuli.
Apple Defender. To measure inhibition, an antisaccade task
(Hallett, 1978) was used which was embedded in a narrative
to appeal to younger participants. The task was presented on
a computer screen and the eyetracker was used to measure
eye movements. Two apples were shown on either side of
a centred diagonal cross on the screen. The participant was
instructed to imagine that the apples belonged to him or her.
A cartoon monster was shown to the participant and it was
explained that this monster would appear and eat one of the
apples, and that between each of the monster’s appearances
the participant should look at the cross in the centre of the
screen. Once the monster appears, the other apple is defen-
ded by the participant looking at it. This task was a test of
the participants’ inhibitory skills of reflexive motor movement
when presented with visual stimuli, and is a way to measure
the development of executive control with regard to inhibition.
Coding. The Apple Defender task consisted of 24 trials.
Children under the age of 8 have trouble suppressing reflexive
saccades towards moving stimuli (Munoz & Everling, 2004)
and thus it is not meaningful to measure this task through cor-
rect and incorrect trials, simply because most of the children
are likely to fail on most of the trails. Furthermore, children
are a lot more impatient than adult participants and it was hard
to get all children to complete the full 24 trials. Therefore, in
order to be able to take a fair measure of this task the present
study measured how much time the participant spent not look-
ing at the monster as a fraction of how much time the monster
was displayed during the task.
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Colour-SART. Sustained attention was tested through an ad-
aptation of the Sustained Attention to Response Task (Manly,
Robertson, Galloway & Hawkins, 1999; Robertson, Manly,
Andrade, Baddeley & Yiend, 1997). Instead of using digits
from 1 to 9, five colours were used; red, green, yellow, blue,
and orange. The stimulus was presented on a computer screen
and an external keyboard was used to capture the participant’s
response. Each colour was shown separately, in the form of a
rectangle, 15 times. The order of the colours was semi-random
and equal for each participant. Each colour was displayed for
500 ms with a 100 ms pause of a blank screen between each
colour. The participant was asked to press the spacebar of the
keyboard each time a new colour was shown on the screen
(60 go-trials) except for when the colour was blue (15 no-go-
trials). First the participant was shown all colours one at a time
and was asked to name them. After that, the participant was
given a test run of 15 trials after which the task started.
Coding. From the total 75 trials, one point was awarded
for each correct trial. A trial was considered correct if the
participant did not press the spacebar when the colour blue was
presented, or if the participant did press the spacebar when any
other colour was presented. Go- and no-go-trials were then
separately standardised through calculating a z-score, and the
mean of the two z-scores was used as measure of the Colour-
SART task.
Shape School. In order to measure task inhibition Espy’s
(1997) Shape School was used. Stimuli were presented in the
form of a story with eight illustrations using a binder. The
Shape School task is divided into four scenes: (1) baseline, (2)
inhibit, (3) switch, and (4) inhibit and switch.
In each scene, coloured shapes with cartoon faces repres-
enting pupils of a preschool was presented to the participant.
The task was always to name the pupils as fast as possible.
In the first scene the participant was told that these pupils
were lining up to go in to their preschool, and that each pupil’s
name was the same as its colour. The participant was then
asked to name all the pupils. This was the baseline measure-
ment of the participant’s performance.
In the second scene, the pupils were shown lining up for
lunch. Some of the pupils were sad to go for lunch because
they were not ready to go back in, whilst others were ready
and thus happy. The participant was asked to name only the
ready pupils.
In the third scene, the participant was introduced to a new
class lining up for art. Some were wearing hats. The parti-
cipant was told that these pupils were named after their shape.
The participant was then asked to name all the pupils in the
line; either named after their shape, or, if hatless, after their
colour.
In the fourth scene, the pupils were lined up to wash their
hands after the arts class. Some of the pupils were sad to wash
because they were not finished doing art, whilst others were
ready and thus happy. The participant was asked to name only
the ready pupils; also here either by shape or colour.
Coding. Unfortunately, the experiment leader of this par-
ticular test misunderstood how it was supposed to be carried
out, which lead to that only the scores for the inhibition task of
this test could be used. 1 point was awarded for each correctly
inhibited pupil’s name with a maximum total of 6 points.
Sally-Anne Task. The Sally-Anne task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie
& Frith, 1985) was used in order to test the participants’ abil-
ity in attributing false beliefs. The story is presented on the
computer screen as a video and the participant was given the
headphones in order to hear the story as told by a recorded
voice. A room with a basket and a box was shown in the video
along with two doll protagonists, Sally and Anne. Sally played
with a ball which she then placed in the basket covering it with
a blanket. She then left the room. Anne picked up the ball and
moved it to the box and put on the lid. Once Sally returned
the recorded voice said “I wonder where Sally will look for
her ball?”. After a short pause the participant was asked to
point where he or she believed Sally would look for the ball.
Once the participant had pointed, he or she was asked three
memory questions: (1) “Where did Sally place the ball?”, (2)
“Did Sally see when Anne moved the ball?”, and (3) “Where
is the ball now?”. Lastly an evaluative question was asked:
“Why would Sally look for the ball in this place?”. A second
trial was run with exactly the same setup except that this time
Sally stayed in the room whilst Anne moved the ball. The
memory questions were asked in order to make sure that the
participants had fully understood the story, and the evaluative
question shows to what extent the participant can verbally ex-
plain Sally’s behaviour and thus is a measure of verbalised the-
ory of mind. This study collected data of the false belief task
jointly with a concurrently running study which focused on
theory of mind. Due to experiment setup of the joint study, a
second version of the the false belief task was also used where
a boy named Max had been given a chocolate bar which he
placed in a cupboard (Perner & Lang, 1999). In this version his
mother moves the chocolate and the same procedure as in the
Sally-Anne true and false belief conditions were used. Half of
the children were assigned to the Sally-Anne version and the
other half were assigned to the Max-Mother version. Verbal
responses to the questions asked were recorded through the
computer microphone and non-verbal responses were marked
in a protocol.
Coding. Which container the participant points to when
asked, and the answer the participant gives as to why Sally or
Max looked for the object where they did, were used to assess
the participants’ understanding of false belief. A participant
was awarded 1 point for pointing correctly and 1 point for a
correct verbal account (e.g. “Sally did not see Anne move the
ball” for the false belief condition). With the two conditions,
a participant could therefore score a possible total of 4 points.
Droodle Task. A second task for measuring understanding
of others’ false beliefs used in this study was the Droodle Task
(Chandler & Helm, 1984). In this task, participants are shown
stylised drawings. It could for example be a doodle of a cat.
Then a piece of cardboard with a small cut-out square is placed
on top of the drawing, revealing only a small portion of the
picture, such as the cat’s tail. The participant is then asked
what a friend of his or hers would make of the picture if only
shown this small part. The idea here is that if a participant is
unable to attribute false beliefs to others then he or she will say
that the friend will think it is a cat or a cat’s tail. On the other
hand, if the participant has a developed theory of mind and
thus is able to attribute false beliefs to others, he or she will
say that the friend would think that it is an image of a hockey
stick, for example. The stimuli were presented in a binder.
Coding. If the participant’s report on what the friend would
say was congruent with the complete drawing, the participant
was awarded 0 points. If the participant said that he or she
did not know what the friend would think they were awarded
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1 point. If the explanation of what the friend would think was
incongruent with the complete drawing, the participant was
awarded 2 points. Three images were shown to each parti-
cipant thereby giving them a possible total of 6 points.
Main Task. The main task of the present study consisted of
playing the TA-based mathematics game Bird Hero which is
developed in JavaScript and HTML5. The game initially con-
sisted of three game modes: (1) pupil plays; (2) TA watches
pupil play; (3) pupil guides TA. The original game has been
adapted for this study and a fourth game mode has been ad-
ded: (4) pupil watches TA play. The four game modes are
depicted in Figure 3.
Thus, in Game Mode 1 the participant played alone, help-
ing the chicks to the correct branch through manoeuvring the
lift panel. In Game Mode 2 the TA was introduced, and all
he did was observing the participant play. In Game Mode
3 the TA suggested which lift button should be pressed by
presenting his choice in a thought bubble. The participant then
chose whether the TA was correct or incorrect through a bin-
ary choice by pressing a green tick or a red cross respectively.
These binary buttons were presented centred at the bottom
of the computer screen (see Figure 3c) and the TA’s thought
bubble did not disappear until the participant pressed one of
these binary buttons. In Game Mode 4 the TA played without
any help from the participant. Each mode consisted of help-
ing two birds home to their nests, except for Game Mode 3 in
which four birds were helped. Participants wore headphones
during game play in order to be able to listen to the TA and the
birds.
Throughout the game, four different distracting visual
stimuli were used in the form of animations that were irrelev-
ant to game play (Figure 4): (1) an aeroplane passing by in the
background; (2) a branch falling from the tree; (3) a football
rolling across the grass in front of the TA and the bird; and (4)
a flickering square symbolising a program glitch. These visual
stimuli were intended to distract the participants. The anima-
tions are not meant to be a part of a final version of Bird Hero
but were used as a simulated noisy environment, condensed
into an eye-trackable area, and are a means of measuring dis-
tractibility. The aim was to investigate which participants were
able to inhibit these stimuli throughout game play and focus
their visual attention on the task at hand.
(a) Pupil playing. (b) TA watching pupil play.
(c) Pupil guiding TA. (d) Pupil watching TA play.
Figure 3: The four different game modes of Bird Hero.
The distractive animations were played in Game Mode 3
and 4 at crucial parts of game play when the player — to profit
from the game — would have to concentrate on the TA. In
Game Mode 3, in which the TA helps four birds while the pu-
pil guides the TA, the football (Figure 4a) rolled passed on the
lower part of the screen as the TA presented his suggestion in
the thought bubble on the second bird, and the branch (Figure
4b) fell passed to the far right on the screen as the TA presen-
ted his suggestion in the thought bubble on the fourth bird.
The football animation played for 3 seconds whilst the branch
animation played for 2 seconds.
The animations are played back when the TA makes an ac-
tion which the player must attend to, however, in Game Mode
3 the player is in control of the game and can look at the
thought bubble any time after the distracting animation has
finished. Thus these distractions were implemented to give a
more general view of how distractions affect the participants
and are a means of comparing two similar time windows where
the distracting animations are either present (bird 2 and 4) or
absent (bird 1 and 3).
In Game Mode 4, in which the TA helps two birds whilst
the pupil watches the TA play, the glitch (Figure 4c) flickered
in the top left corner of the screen just as the TA made his
choice on the first bird, and after he had made his choice the
aeroplane (Figure 4d) flew past diagonally, entering the top
left corner of the screen. On the second bird, the same two
animations were played but in reversed order (i.e. aeroplane
during the TA’s choice and glitch after the TA’s choice). These
animations both played for 2 seconds.
The way the TA makes his choice is by moving his hand
horizontally, from left to right, along the eight lift buttons at
the bottom of the computer screen (see Figure 3d), once he
reaches the end of the screen, he moves his hand back from
right to left and makes his selection. His hand then continues
all the way to the left, and the hand is moved horizontally once
more from left to right and back again and leaves the screen on
the far left. The TA’s hand movement across the screen takes 2
seconds. The reason why the TA moves his hand along the lift
buttons twice is so that when the two animations are played —
during and after the TA’s choice — the TA’s hand is situated
at the same spot in order to make the two conditions as sim-
ilar as possible with the only difference that a lift button is up
or down, depending on whether it has been pressed by the TA
(a) Rolling football. (b) Falling branch.
(c) Flickering glitch. (d) Flying aeroplane.
Figure 4: The four visually distracting animations.
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or not. The animations were played 1 second before the TA
reached the button he was meant to press (during TA choice)
or had recently pressed (after TA choice). This is a time lim-
ited situation where the TA is in charge of the game and the
participant has to make an active choice of either attending to
the TA’s actions or to the distracting animations.
Coding. Eye tracking, at a rate of 250 Hz, was used
throughout game play on all participants. Because the game
holds many moving elements fixations are extremely hard to
measure, instead, gaze proportions of, or accumulated gaze
time on, areas of interest (AOIs) were used. The AOIs were
defined as Bird, Lift Buttons or Binary Buttons, Distraction,
and TA or TA Hand. These measures were calculated by
dividing the eye-tracking data during animation playback (2
or 3 s) into 100 ms blocks and measuring how many milli-
seconds were spent gazing at these AOIs during each block.
This gives a measure of gaze proportion (%) which could eas-
ily be presented in a graph over time (10 samples per s), or
these proportions could be summarised across all blocks for a
particular AOI and thus translated into gaze time (ms) on that
AOI. The gaze time spent on the glitch and aeroplane in Game
Mode 4 during the TA’s choice was used as measure of dis-
tractibility. The reason is that this is a very important part of
the game where the TA is meant to show what he has learnt.
Player’s allowing themselves to be distracted at this crucial
moment will not be paying enough attention to the more vital
parts of the game and will therefore not be able to benefit as
much from the use of a TA.
3 Results
Of the 65 participants, 36 were part of the analysis (20 girls;
Mage= 5;2 years, SD= 9 months). The large drop-off was due
to three reasons: (1) some of the participants were not at all fa-
miliar with numbers and could not complete the main task; (2)
some participants were reluctant to complete all pre-tests; and
(3) the eye tracking data were too poor for some participants
in the main or pre-tests. Furthermore, due to a programming
error not all participants were presented with the branch anim-
ation distraction. Therefore, the eye tracking data concerning
the branch animation was not subjected to any analysis. Stat-
istical analysis was performed in RStudio (v.0.97.316) using
the statistical programming language R (v.2.15.1).
Pre-Tests
In general, the participants seemed able to carry out the pre-
test tasks, although many of them needed some encourage-
ment to complete them. The means and standard deviations
summarised in Table 1 show that participants performed quite
well on the pre-test tasks in general, except for the Droodle
Task as indicated by its low mean value.
Screening of the pre-test measures with the participants’
ages (Table 2) revealed a positive, statistically significant Pear-
son coefficient of correlations between age and the Apple De-
fender task, and also between age and the Colour-SART task.
The Sally-Anne task showed a tendency towards a statistic-
ally significant and positive correlation coefficient with age
(p = 0.06) as well as with Colour-SART (p = 0.06). None
of the pre-tests of executive functions showed statistically sig-
nificant correlation coefficients with one another, and neither
did those of theory of mind.
Table 1: Mean and standard deviation of the measures of executive
functions (EF) and theory of mind (ToM). The unit of all measures
are number of correct trials except for Apple Defender which is a
fraction (see Method section).
M SE Max
EF
Apple Defender 0.60 0.03 1
Colour-SART
Go 48.94 1.38 60
No-Go 8.89 0.50 15
Shape School 4.47 0.36 6
ToM Sally-Anne 2.19 0.22 4Droodle 1.36 0.37 6
Main Task
The graphs of Figure 5 show two similar time windows of the
game — just when the TA presents its choice in a thought
bubble of Game Mode 3 — where the difference is that the
football animation was played as a distraction in the second
time window (Facet B of Figure 5). The two time windows
are illustrated in the game screen shots (Figure 3c and 4a). In
both time windows, gaze proportions are averaged over the 36
participants. As can be noted by the graphs, the distracting an-
imation takes quite a lot of the participants’ attention. Looking
at the difference graph (Facet C of Figure 5), it is evident that
the distraction steals equal amounts of attention from the more
relevant areas of interest. On average, the participants spent
994 ms (SE = 125 ms) of the total 3 seconds animation play-
back time looking at the distraction.
This can then be contrasted with the graph of Figure 6
which represents gaze proportions on AOIs during (Facet A
of Figure 5) and after (Facet B of Figure 5) the TA makes his
choice in Game Mode 4. Gaze proportions are averaged over
the 36 participants and consists of the TA helping two birds.
A majority of the participants did not attend to the distracting
animations at all during the TA’s choice (20 out of the 36) and
only 2 participants attended to both of them.
Distractibility Analysis
In Game Mode 4, the average time during which the parti-
cipants gazed at the distraction during and after the TA’s choice
was 198 ms (SE = 43 ms) and 581 ms (SE = 82 ms), respect-
ively. A paired t-test of dependent measures revealed a stat-
istically significant difference in attention to the distractions
during these time windows (t = −4.08,d f = 35, p < 0.001).
The frequency distribution of accumulated time spent gazing
on distractions during the TA’s choice is presented in Figure 7,
it shows the frequency of participants within a given gaze time
interval. This measure was used as a dependent variable in
two multiple regression analyses using the enter method with
the executive functions and theory of mind pre-test measures
as independent variables. The models are presented in Table 3
(F3,32 = 1.9, p= 0.149,R2 = 0.151) and 4 (F2,33 = 1.385, p=
0.265,R2 = 0.077). Only Colour-SART showed a statistically
significant relationship with distractibility.
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Table 2: Pearson’s coefficient of correlations between age and pre-test results of 36 observations.
Age Apple Defender Colour-SART Shape School Sally-Anne
Apple Defender 0.45∗∗
Colour-SART 0.33∗ 0.27
Shape School 0.07 0.13 0.27
Sally-Anne 0.32 0.18 0.32 0.23
Droodle 0.24 0.23 –0.10 0.03 –0.15
∗p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
∗∗p < 0.01 (two-tailed).
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Figure 5: Gaze proportion in two similar time windows of four areas of interest over time with (Facet A) and without (Facet B) the football
distraction in Game Mode 3. Graph (Facet C) shows the resulting difference from gaze proportions of graph (Facet A) subtracted from those
of graph (Facet B). Duration is the length of the football animation distraction, and 0 on the x-axis denotes distraction onset.
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Figure 6: Gaze proportion of four areas of interest over time during (Facet A) and after (Facet B) TA choice in Game Mode 4. The time
duration is the length of the glitch/aeroplane animation distractions, and 0 on the x-axis denotes distraction onset.
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Figure 7: The frequency distribution of the distractibility measure.
Table 3: The results of a multiple regression analysis using the enter
method of 36 observations with distractibility as dependent variable
and the pre-test measures of executive functions as independent vari-
ables.
β t p
Apple Defender –0.093 –0.550 0.586
Colour-SART 0.731∗ 2.283 0.029
Shape School –0.211 –1.241 0.224
∗p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
Table 4: The results of a multiple regression analysis using the enter
method of 36 observations with distractibility as dependent variable
and the pre-test measures of theory of mind as independent variables.
β t p
Sally-Anne 0.251 1.482 0.148
Droodle –0.088 –0.518 0.608
Table 5: The results of a step-wise multiple regression analysis of
16 observations with all pre-test measures of executive functions as
well as theory of mind as independent variables, and distractibility as
dependent variable.
β t p
Apple Defender –0.344∗ –2.271 0.042
Colour-SART 0.793 2.164 0.052
Sally-Anne 0.244 1.496 0.161
∗p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
Delimited Analysis
The frequency distribution of the distractibility measure re-
veals something of a floor-effect (Figure 7); the participants
were simply too good at focusing on the TA at a crucial point
of the game. This means that distractibility did not present it-
self in a gradient across participants as hypothesised. Due to
the low predictive value of the Shape School and Apple De-
fender measures (Table 3), it can be suggested that the cog-
nitive ability of inhibition, as measured in this study, does
not play as vital role in attending to the TA’s actions as first
thought. Neither does the measures of theory of mind seem
to play any role. Only the Colour-SART measure showed any
statistically significant relationship with distractibility, which
could suggest that attentional abilities are more important than
inhibitory or social.
However, there are also possible issues with some of the
pre-test measures with regard to how they were collected. Age
is usually a good predictor of development of executive func-
tions and theory of mind, however, as shown above only two of
the pre-test measures had a statistically significant correlation
coefficient with age (Table 2). It was explained in the method
section that the experiment leader misunderstood how to col-
lect data for the Shape School task. This could have affected
this measure’s predictive abilities. Furthermore, the tasks for
theory of mind were carried out with very few trials on each
participant and might not give a fair representation of the par-
ticipants’ current level in development of theory of mind.
By using only the participants that spent more than 0 ms
gazing at the distractions during the TA’s choice and analyse
their distractibility against their performance on the pre-tests,
it was hypothesised that it should give an indication of whether
it is at all possible to predict distractibility from the collected
pre-test data.
The 16 participants that had been distracted by the anim-
ations during the TA’s choice was used in a step-wise mul-
tiple regression analysis with distractibility as dependent vari-
able and all the pre-test measures as independent variables
(F3,12 = 4.967, p = 0.018,R2 = 0.554). Table 5 illustrates
the best model in predicting distractive gaze behaviour from
all pre-test measures. Only the three pre-tests that showed
strong correlation coefficients with age remained in the model:
Apple Defender, Colour-SART, and Sally-Anne task. Apple
Defender now showed a statistically significant relationship
with distractibility and Colour-SART showed only a margin-
ally statistically significant relationship with distractibility. It
should of course be noted that this result is based on a too
small sample to give enough statistical power to draw any
far-reaching conclusions, but at least it is an inkling towards
these measures’ possible predictive ability of distractibility in
preschoolers, given a larger sample.
4 Discussion
The present study found a statistically significant difference
in preschoolers attention to distracting visual stimuli during
versus after a teachable agent’s (TA) actions. These findings
reveal that preschool children were less inclined to be distrac-
ted during a TA action than they were after completion of the
action. By being able to inhibit distractions, the preschool-
ers increases their chances of attending to more important fea-
tures of the game. As is shown in the graph of Figure 6, the
preschoolers focus more of their attention on the TA’s hand
and the lift buttons, one of which the TA is about to press,
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and less on the bird and distraction which are less important to
benefit from the game.
Similar to the findings of Lindström et al. (2011), the res-
ults of the present study show that, just as primary school
children, preschoolers also pay close attention to the TA even
when only observing and not actively playing the game. Fur-
thermore, this corroborates the findings of Axelsson et al.
(2013) that preschoolers pay attention to their TA.
The general hypothesis proposed in this thesis was not con-
firmed: no true gradient of attention to distractions which cor-
related to this study’s measurements of executive functions
and theory of mind were found amongst the preschoolers. This
makes it difficult to portray preschoolers distractibility with re-
lation to executive control and theory of mind. Regarding the
20 participants that were not distracted at all during the TA’s
choice, there must be one or more cognitive abilities that these
participants have in common which were not measured in this
study. The upside to this outcome is that preschoolers are very
much able to perform top-down guidance of their attention in
the crucial moment of game play when the TA displays his
newly learnt skills, regardless of how well they performed on
the pre-tests.
Implications
As previously discussed, attention to the TA’s actions is very
important in order to allow for metacognitive reasoning, just
like the children observing adults counting in the study of Gel-
man and Meck (1983). The currently presented results gives
reason to believe that preschoolers at least have the basic abil-
ities in place in order to enable metacognitive reasoning.
TA-based games can provide a much more tailored and
individualised learning experience. This could be a means
for preschools to more easily fulfil the curriculum’s goal of
individualised tutoring which can be demanding given that
preschools usually have a high ratio of pupils to teachers. This
has, for example, posed benefits for preventing number sense
deficiency in primary school, in line with the findings that
low-achieving pupils usually benefits the most from TA-based
games (Chase et al., 2009).
Furthermore, this study showed that preschool children are
not as distracted by visual animations as one might believe.
The results of this study suggests that children are able to
filter out distractions when their interest and focus is else-
where. The big differences in attention to the Football anima-
tion (Game Mode 3; Figure 5) in relation to the aeroplane and
glitch (Game Mode 4; Figure 6) may indicate that there exists
a motivational effect grounded in time limited event of the TA
action of choosing which helps the preschoolers to focus.
It was noted during data collection and also in the eye-
tracking data that children pay close attention to the characters
faces. A sugesstion to developers of TA-based games could be
to add facial expressions to TA characters in order to convey
emotional cues that can be read by the player, and by that let
them conclude whether the TA seems confident or diffident in
suggested solutions to problems. Especially with preschool-
ers, this could be a way to further aid metacognition.
Limitations
When considering the significance of the Colour-SART meas-
ure with relation to distractibility, it can at a first glance seem
counter-intuitive that the relation is positive (Table 3; i.e. the
better you perform on Colour-SART the more likely you are
to be distracted). Colour-SART was chosen as a measure of
sustained attention and the idea was initially that it would re-
late to the sustained attention to the TA. However, it is rather a
measure of sustained attention to changes in the environment.
What the positive relation to distractibility entails is that chil-
dren who are better able to remain focused and notice when the
colour blue appears in Colour-SART are also the ones more
sensitive to the distractive animations. Instead of measuring
sustained attention, this study should have employed a meas-
ure of selective attention (see the Introduction Section).
Though the delimited analysis of Colour-SART and Apple
Defender did show significant results in relation to distractib-
ility, with regard to participants that were distracted, this study
had too few participants to enable any conclusions of the re-
lation between preschoolers’ distractibility and level of devel-
opment of executive functions and theory of mind. Because
of the floor-effect of the distractibility measure, a much lar-
ger sample of participants would be needed to have enough
statistical power to draw any useful conclusions.
Future Research
In this study, two new ways of measuring young children’s ex-
ecutive functions have been developed from tasks designed for
measuring these abilities in adults. Both Apple Defender and
Colour-SART gave a hint of their predictive ability through the
delimited analysis. It would be interesting to further investig-
ate their use in evaluation of executive functions in children of
preschool age.
Because research question 2 remains unanswered there is
no way of saying whether a well developed theory of mind
could compensate for lack in development of executive func-
tions. There is, however, one very interesting aspect of theory
of mind that could be further explored. First of all, there is
no way yet of concluding whether preschoolers would actu-
ally benefit from a TA-based game. To answer this, a more
longitudinal study of learning effects would have to be con-
ducted. In this research it would be interesting to relate the
development of theory of mind to metacognitive reasoning
with regards to teachable agents. Could there, for example,
be an interaction between playing TA-based games and devel-
opment of theory of mind which lets children develop a theory
of mind quicker than children learning through more conven-
tional learning methods?
In conclusion, preschoolers seem to be sufficiently de-
veloped in their cognitive abilities to enable them to focus
enough on teachable agents to inhibit distractions. Although
the present study cannot establish a cut-off age of when TA-
based games should be introduced, we can at least with con-
fidence continue to investigate the use of teachable agents with
children aged 3 to 6.
Acknowledgements
First of all, a big, warm, grateful thank you to the children who
participated in this study and also to the preschool pedagogues
of Ljunggården’s Preschool whose cooperative spirit made this
study possible. A thank you is also directed towards preschool
director Jessica Algback who welcomed the study.
Special thank you to my supervisors Professor Agneta
Gulz and Dr. Richard Andersson of Lund University Cog-
nitive Science for their dedicated guidance in the process of
conducting this study with regard to valuable advice on re-
search methods, statistics and also invaluable comments for
10
improving the text.
A special thank you go to Mette Clausen-Bruun for valu-
able discussions, as well as to Christoffer Andersson and Dr.
Östen Axelsson for proof reading and valuable comments on
the text. Thanks also go to Erik Anderberg, Christoffer An-
dersson, Maria Bellinger, Mette Clausen-Bruun, George Grön-
wall for participating in pre-test validations as well as to Se-
bastian Magnusson for participating in piloting the pre-tests.
References
Anderberg, E., Axelsson, A., Bengtsson, S., Håkansson, M.
& Lindberg, L. (2013). Exploring the use of a teach-
able agent in a mathematical computer game for preschool-
ers. In C. Balkenius, A. Gulz, M. Haake & B. Johansson
(Eds.), Intelligent, socially oriented technology (Vol. 154,
pp. 161–171). Lund: Lund University Cognitive Studies.
Axelsson, A., Anderberg, E. & Haake, M. (2013). Can
preschoolers profit from a teachable agent based play-and-
learn-game in mathematics? In H. C. Lane, K. Yacef,
J. Mostow & P. Pavlik (Eds.), AIED 2013, LNAI (Vol.
7926, pp. 289–298). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer.
Bargh, J. A. & Schul, Y. (1980). On the cognitive benefits of
teaching. Journal of Educational Psychology, 72(6), 583–
604.
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M. & Frith, U. (1985, October).
Does the autistic child have a "theory of mind"? Cognition,
21(1), 37–46.
Berch, D. B. (2005, August). Making sense of number sense:
Implications for children with mathematical disabilities.
Journal of Learning Disabilities, 38(4), 333–339.
Biswas, G., Leelawong, K., Schwartz, D., Vye, N. & The
Teachable Agents Group at Vanderbilt. (2005). Learning
by teaching: A new agent paradigm for educational soft-
ware. Applied Artificial Intelligence, 19(3-4), 363–392.
Brophy, S., Biswas, G., Katzlberger, T., Bransford, J. &
Schwartz, D. (1999). Teachable agents: Combining in-
sights from learning theory and computer science. In
S. P. Lajoie & M. Vivet (Eds.), Artificial intelligence in
education (pp. 21–28). IOS Press.
Bruer, J. (1997). Education and the brain: A bridge too far.
Educational researcher, 26(8), 4–16.
Burgess, P. W., Alderman, N., Evans, J., Emslie, H. & Wilson,
B. A. (1998, November). The ecological validity of tests
of executive function. Journal of the International Neuro-
psychological Society : JINS, 4(6), 547–58.
Chandler, M. J. & Helm, D. (1984). Developmental changes
in the contribution of shared experience to social. Interna-
tional Journal of Behavioral Development, 145(7), 145–
156.
Chase, C. C., Chin, D. B., Oppezzo, M. A. & Schwartz, D. L.
(2009, June). Teachable agents and the protégé effect: In-
creasing the effort towards learning. Journal of Science
Education and Technology, 18(4), 334–352.
Clements, W. & Perner, J. (1994). Implicit understanding of
belief. Cognitive development, 9(4), 377–395.
Dalton, P. & Fraenkel, N. (2012). Gorillas we have missed:
Sustained inattentional deafness fordynamic events. Cog-
nition, 124, 367–372.
Deubel, H. & Schneider, W. X. (1996). Saccade target selec-
tion and object recognition: Evidence for a common atten-
tional mechanism. Vision Research, 36(12), 1827–1837.
Espy, K. (1997). The shape school: Assessing executive func-
tion in preschool children. Developmental Neuropsycho-
logy, 13(4), 37–41.
Garavan, H. (2002, December). Dissociable executive func-
tions in the dynamic control of behavior: Inhibition, er-
ror detection, and correction. NeuroImage, 17(4), 1820–
1829.
Garnham, W. A. & Perner, J. (2001, September). Actions
really do speak louder than words – but only implicitly:
Young children’s understanding of false belief in action.
British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 19(3), 413–
432.
Garon, N., Bryson, S. E. & Smith, I. M. (2008, January). Ex-
ecutive function in preschoolers: A review using an integ-
rative framework. Psychological bulletin, 134(1), 31–60.
Gelman, R. & Meck, E. (1983). Preschoolers counting: Prin-
ciples before skill. Cognition, 13, 343–359.
Gersten, R. & Chard, D. (1999, April). Number sense: Re-
thinking arithmetic instruction for students with mathem-
atical disabilities. The Journal of Special Education, 33(1),
18–28.
Griffin, S. (2004, January). Building number sense with num-
ber worlds: a mathematics program for young children.
Early Childhood Research Quarterly, 19(1), 173–180.
Gulz, A., Haake, M. & Silvervarg, A. (2011). Extending a
teachable agent with a social conversation module – effects
on student experiences and learning. Artificial Intelligence
in Education, 106–114.
Hallett, P. E. (1978). Primary and secondary saccades to goals
defined by instructions. Vision Research, 18, 1279–1296.
Hannula, M. M., Mattinen, A. & Lehtinen, E. (2005). Does
social interaction influence 3-year-old children’s tendency
to focus on numerosity? a quasi-experimental study in day
care. In E. De Corte, G. Kanselaar & M. Valcke (Eds.),
Studia paedagogica, 41 (pp. 63–80). Leuven University
Press.
Jordan, N. C., Kaplan, D., Nabors Oláh, L. & Locuniak, M. N.
(2006). Number sense growth in kindergarten: A longitud-
inal investigation of children at risk for mathematics diffi-
culties. Child development, 77(1), 153–75.
Kok, A. (1999, April). Varieties of inhibition: Manifestations
in cognition, event-related potentials and aging. Acta Psy-
chologica, 101(2-3), 129–58.
Lindström, P., Gulz, A., Haake, M. & Sjödén, B. (2011, Febru-
ary). Matching and mismatching between the pedagogical
design principles of a math game and the actual practices
of play. Journal of Computer Assisted Learning, 27(1),
90–102.
Manly, T., Robertson, I., Galloway, M. & Hawkins, K. (1999).
The absent mind: Further investigations of sustained atten-
tion to response. Neuropsychologia, 550–559.
Monsell, S. (2003, March). Task switching. Trends in Cognit-
ive Sciences, 7(3), 134–140.
Moore, C., Jarrold, C., Russell, J., Lumb, A. & Sapp, F.
(1995). Conflicting desire and the child’s theory of mind.
Cognitive Development, 10, 467–482.
Munoz, D. P. & Everling, S. (2004). Look away: The anti-
saccade task and the voluntary control of eye movement.
Nature, 5, 218–228.
Norman, D. A. & Shallice, T. (2000). Attention to ac-
tion: Willed and automatic control of behavior. In
M. S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), Neuroscience: A reader (pp. 376–
390). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc.
Pareto, L., Arvemo, T., Dahl, Y., Haake, M. & Gulz, A.
11
(2011). A teachable-agent arithmetic game’s effects on
mathematics understanding, attitude and self-efficacy. In
G. Biswas, S. Bull, J. Kay & A. Mitrovic (Eds.), AIED’11
proceedings of the 15th international conference on ar-
tificial intelligence in education (pp. 247–255). Berlin,
Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.
Pareto, L., Haake, M., Lindström, P., Sjödén, B. & Gulz, A.
(2012, April). A teachable-agent-based game affording
collaboration and competition: Evaluating math compre-
hension and motivation. Educational Technology Research
and Development, 60(5), 723–751.
Peirce, J. W. (2007). Psychopy - psychophysics software in
python. Journal of Neuroscience Methods, 162(1-2), 8–
13.
Perner, J. & Lang, B. (1999, September). Development of
theory of mind and executive control. Trends in cognitive
sciences, 3(9), 337–344.
Robertson, I. H., Manly, T., Andrade, J., Baddeley, B. T. &
Yiend, J. (1997). ’Oops’: Performance correlates of every-
day attentional failures in traumatic brain injured and nor-
mal subjects. Neuropsychologia, 35(6), 747–758.
Sarter, M., Givens, B. & Bruno, J. P. (2001). The cognit-
ive neuroscience of sustained attention: where top-down
meets bottom-up. Brain Research Reviews, 35(2), 146 -
160.
Schwartz, D. & Blair, K. (2007). Animations of thought:
Interactivity in the teachable agent paradigm. In R. Lowe
& W. Schnotz (Eds.), Learning with animation: Research
and implications for design (pp. 114–140). Cambridge,
UK: Cambrige University Press.
Schwartz, D. L., Chase, C., Chin, D., Oppezzo, M., Kwong,
H., Okita, S., . . . Wagster, J. (2009). Interactive meta-
cognition: Monitoring and regulating a teachable agent. In
D. Hacker, J. Dunlosky & A. Graesser (Eds.), Handbook
of metacognition in education (pp. 340–358). Routledge
Press.
Sjödén, B., Tärning, B., Pareto, L. & Gulz, A. (2011). Trans-
ferring teaching to testing – an unexplored aspect of teach-
able agents. Artificial Intelligence in Education, 337–344.
Skolverket. (2011). Curriculum for the preschool lpfö 98
revised 2010 (policy document No. 2704). Stockholm,
Sweden.
Southgate, V., Chevallier, C. & Csibra, G. (2010). Seventeen-
month-olds appeal to false beliefs to interpret others’ ref-
erential communication. Developmental Science, 13(6),
907–912.
Tipper, S. & Cranston, M. (1985). Selective attention
and priming: Inhibitory and facilitatory effects of ignored
primes. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psycho-
logy, 37(4), 591–611.
Zhao, G. & Shen, Z. (2012). Learning-by-Teaching: Design-
ing Teachable Agents with Intrinsic Motivation. Educa-
tional Technology & Society, 15, 62–74.
12
